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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Honorable Sandra N. Pueler presiding, 
entered on February 23, 1995, after a summary judgment ruling in 
favor of Plaintiff Ted Sommer and against Defendant Transmission 
Tech Inc., on the issue of lien priority in and to a dump truck, 
which decision was entered December 16, 1994, and after trial on 
December 21, 1994 as to the amount of each claimed lien. Appeal was 
taken by Defendant Transmission Tech Inc., on March 20, 1995. 
Jurisdiction is proper under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(d) and the notice of 
appeal is timely filed under Rule 4, U.R.A.P. with respect to 
Defendant Transmission Tech Inc. 
Defendants Wayne Sommer (truck purchaser and obligor to both 
Plaintiff and Defendant Transmission Tech Inc.) and Jack W. Sommer 
(titled owner of the truck) have not filed an appeal and the 
judgment below is a final and binding judgment as against them. To 
the extent that Appellant herein attempts to "bootstrap" Wayne 
Sommer into the present action, Appellee objects inasmuch as no 
appeal was filed within the time period (or subsequently) 
permitted by Rule 4, U.R.A.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Circuit Court erred in granting a motor vehicle 
seller's motion for summary judgment on the issue of a seller's 
title retaining lien having priority over a subsequent repairman's 
lien where the repairman/lien claimant sought to amend its pleading 
1 
and raise new issues not factually supported by the record, which 
motion was heard concurrent with the summary judgment motions only 
nine days prior to trial? (restatement of issues 1,2 and 7 of 
Appellant's brief). 
A challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only 
conclusions of law because, by definition, cases on summary 
judgment do not resolve factual disputes. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the Court erred as a matter of law in ruling at 
summary judgment that the title retaining lien of a motor vehicle 
seller was valid and had priority despite title having been placed 
in the buyer's fathers name, with seller's lien appearing thereon, 
where issues of unconcionability and estoppel were first raised 
after the ruling and do not appear in the pleadings? (Restatement 
of issues 6, 7, and 8 of Appellant's brief). 
Upon review of a motion of summary judgment, the Supreme Court 
applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court. 
Briggs v. Holocomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987).However, when a 
party pursues a motion for summary judgment on one claim, he may 
not, on appeal, either justify the grant of such motion or 
challenge its denial on the basis of a separate and distinct claim. 
L & A Prywall Inc. v. Whitmore Coqstr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 
1980). (The present case having been decided on cross motions for 
summary judgment on the issue of lien priority). 
2 
3, Whether, after granting summary judgment for a motor vehicle 
seller on the on cross motions for declaratory judgment on issue of 
lien priority vis a vis a subsequent repairman's lien, the Court 
erred in refusing to reconsider at a trial on other issues, the 
previously granted motion where, in reliance on the order of 
summary judgment, the prevailing party was not prepared to 
relitigate the issues already decided by the motion? (Restatement 
of issues 3,5 and 9 of Appellant's brief) 
Where the only controversy brought by the parties was the 
interpretation of a writing and both parties placed the question in 
the hands of the Court by making mutual motions for summary 
judgment, the losing party was not entitled to a trial on the facts 
after the court made its decision. Mastic Tile Div. of Ruberoid Co, 
v. Acme Distrib. Co.
 f 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964). The sole 
purpose of summary judgment is to bar from the courts unnecessary 
and unjustified litigation. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. 
Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965). 
A "Motion for Reconsideration" may properly be treated as a 
Motion for a New Trial. See, e.g. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 
808 P.2d 1061 (Utah*, 1991). Granting or denying a motion for a new 
trial will not be set aside except where there is clear abuse of 
the court's discretion. Jensen v. Thomasf 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1977);Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 
1981). The trial Court has broad discretion to grant or deny a 
motion for a new trial. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991). 
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4. Did the court err in denying a motion to amend the pleading to 
add additional counterclaims and cross claims for fraud and 
conspiracy, where such claims had not been previously raised in the 
pleading, where the substantive facts for the new theories were 
available from the onset of the case, the motion was made only one 
month before trial, made after the matter was set for trial, and 
additional discovery would not have been feasible within the time 
remaining for trial? (restatement of issues 4 of Appellant's 
brief) 
Although this rule [U.R.C.P. 15] tends to favor granting leave 
to amend a pleading, the matter remains in the sound discretion of 
the trial court; such discretion was not abused in refusing 
plaintiff's requested leave to amend his complaint where amendments 
would have delayed the trial and the substance of plaintiff's new 
allegation was known a full year earlier. Westley v. Farmer's Ins. 
Exch.
 f 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). See also, Kelly v. Utah Power 7 
Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987); Kleinert v, Kimball Elevator 
Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993). 
5. Did the trial court err in finding at trial that the purchase 
contract was entered into on March 13,1991, was agreed upon as to 
amount to be paid, that it was Defendant Wayne Sommer who requested 
title be in his father's name, and in denying defendant's claim of 
"credits" where no evidence was offered as to the specifics of the 
alleged credits? ( Restatement of appellant's issues 6 & 8). 
4 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P. 2d 1242, 1286 
(Utah 1993); Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 
1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994). If viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's determination, a factual 
finding is based on sufficient evidence, the finding is not clearly 
erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 p.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). 
This standard of review carries with it the reguirement that 
the Appellant marshall the evidence, see, Wade v. Stangel, 869 P.2d 
9, 12 (Utah App. 1994); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991), which in this case has not been 
done. Rather, Appellant has merely made assumptions from the record 
as to its interpretations of the facts, omitting inconsistent 
evidence adduced at trial, and left the burden to the Appellee to 
marshall the evidence, see, e.g. Onieda/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage 
and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994)(appellant 
merely presented carefully selected facts favorable to its position 
rather than properly marshalling the evidence); Robb v. Anderton, 
863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993). Because Appellant failed to 
marshall the evidence in support of challenged findings, findings 
were upheld. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989). The same standard should apply in this case.1 
1
 Appellant also failed to cite to the record where each of its issues were preserved for 
appeal or make a statement as to why issues not preserved should be heard as required in 
U.R. A.P. Rule 24 (a)(5)(A) and(B). This burden also should not be shifted to the Appellee. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case primarily involves conflicting claims of lien in and 
to a 1981 Ford diesel dump truck. Plaintiff Ted Sommer is a used 
equipment dealer, in business some 30 years or so prior to the 
action, dba Sommer's Equipment and Sommer's Auto Wrecking (he has 
several equipment yards). Defendant Wayne Sommer purchased the 
subject vehicle in the spring of 1991 for some $9,000.00, plus tax 
and license, $1,000.00 down, balance to be paid in monthly payments 
with Plaintiff retaining a lien in the vehicle as security for the 
balance. Wayne Sommer had done piece work for the Plaintiff, Ted 
Sommer, and was a distant relative, known to all employees at the 
yard. 
Wayne Sommer asked title be placed in his father's name, Jack 
W. Sommer, not inconsistent with prior vehicle purchases by both 
Wayne and Jack. (Jack Sommer is the Plaintiff's cousin, also well 
known to employees at the yard). 
Wayne Sommer took the truck, used it for a year or so without 
making payments, allegedly loaned it out to someone who burned up 
the engine. Wayne Sommer then, in the fall of 1993, engaged 
Defendant Transmission Tech Inc. to replace the engine, with an 
original bid of $7,000.00, but ultimately the bill exceeded 
$10,400.00, plus storage. Wayne didn't pay the bill, Transmission 
Tech Inc. proceeded to attempt foreclosure of its lien, and after 
receipt of certified notice of proposed mechanics sale, Plaintiff 
commenced this action seeking to have its lien declared superior to 
6 
that of Transmission Tech Inc. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on December 16, 1993, 
with an amended complaint filed December 30, 1993, alleging that 
the Plaintiff had in March, 1991, sold Defendant Wayne Sommer a 
1981 Ford Diesel Truck, total sales price of $9,761.00, with 
$1,000.00 down payment having been received, balance to be paid on 
monthly installments, none of which had been paid. (R. 1-17). 
Plaintiff further acknowledged that at the request of Wayne Sommer, 
title had been placed in his father's name, Jack W. Sommer, but 
that a lien had been reserved by Plaintiff/Seller, Ted Sommer. (R. 
2,6). The amended complaint further advised that Defendant 
Transmission Tech Inc., at request of Defendant Wayne Sommer and 
without notice to the Plaintiff, effected certain repairs to the 
subject vehicle, claiming some $10,400.00 therefor, and asserting 
a lien in the vehicle and right to sell to satisfy the lien.(R. 7, 
12-15). Plaintiff sought from the Court, inter alia, a determination 
that the seller's title retaining lien was prior to that of 
Defendant Transmission Tech Inc.,(hereinafter "Trans Tech"), a 
judgment as to the balance due from Defendant Wayne Sommer and 
authority to recover and sell the truck for satisfaction of the 
liens (to the extent of any proceeds therefrom). 
Defendant Jack Sommer filed a notice claiming no monetary 
interest in the subject truck. (R. 20). Thereafter, Defendants Jack 
and Wayne Sommer filed an Answer (the answer purports to represent 
all "Defendants", but it was known to Plaintiff at this time that 
7 
Trans Tech was not being represented by Mr. Peezley), admitting the 
contract, the sales price and down payment, that monthly payments 
were to be made, and that defendant Wayne Sommer had possession 
and use of the vehicle since the date of sale, and denying the 
remaining allegations. (R. 40-41). 
Defendant Trans Tech filed an Answer, Crossclaim and 
Counterclaim January 24, 1994, wherein it plead for declaratory 
relief as to the priority of its claimed repairman's lien, whether 
it had rights against the title owner, Jack Sommer, method and 
manner of sale, etc. Trans Tech further plead an action against 
Wayne Sommer for the cost of the repairs. (R. 31-37). 
Plaintiff filed his reply agreeing that declaratory relief was 
needed by the parties and discovery was commenced. 
The case was originally assigned to Judge Fuchs, during which 
time discovery was had by both Plaintiff and Trans Tech. Attorney 
Peezly withdrew as counsel for Wayne and Jack Sommer, (R. 92), 
Ralph Marsh appeared on behalf of Jack Sommer, (R. 67), and Ross 
Kinney was associated with attorney Lybbert on behalf of Trans Tech 
(R. 94-95).Plaintiff filed his Motion and memorandum in support of 
Summary Judgment against Defendant Trans Tech on the issue of 
priority of lien on July 13, 1994 (R.105-161). By July 21, 1994 the 
case had been assigned to Judge Pueler. (R. 250-251). 
An affidavit had been filed in July, 1994 by Trans Tech in 
response to the motion for Summary Judgment, in which it argued in 
part that the motion was premature, some discovery having not yet 
been received. (R. 165-281). Then, on August 10, 1994, Defendant 
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Trans Tech filed its opposing memorandum. (R. 265-286). Ironically, 
despite having argued the motion was premature, Defendant Trans 
Tech then filed the notice of readiness for decision on Plaintiff's 
summary judgment motion. (R. 339) 
A pretrial conference was held August 31, 1994, (R. 264), 
wherein discovery cut off dates were set, and a trial date of 
somewhere between the 12-22 of December was proposed to coordinate 
with Mr. Kinney's schedule. (R. 96, 291). On November 8th, 19 94, 
notice of trial was sent out by counsel for Trans Tech, trial date 
to be December 21, 1994. Then, on November 21, 1994, Defendant 
Trans Tech filed its Motion to Amend the Pleading, setting forth 
additional cross claims and counterclaims, and filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and memorandum in support, arguing its new 
"fraudulent conspiracy" theory. (R. 390-502,524-616). Additional 
affidavits were filed, and memoranda were filed, and the matter was 
set for hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment and the 
motion to amend on December 12, 1994.(R. 503). 
The Court, Hon. Sandra Pueler, ruled at the summary judgment 
hearing on December 12, 1994 and denied Defendant Trans Tech's 
Motion to Amend the Pleading, granted certain motions to compel 
responses to discovery against Wayne Sommer, and took under 
advisement the motions for summary judgment, both parties having 
just filed additional memoranda. (R. 753-755). On December 16, 1994 
Judge Pueler entered her memorandum decision granting Plaintiff's 
motion and denying defendant Trans Tech's motion for summary 
judgment, specifically ruling that the fraud defense/offense 
9 
claimed by Trans Tech was inapplicable, stating "Although he [Wayne 
Sommer] placed the vehicle in his father's name, he made no 
material representation on which Trans Tech relied to its 
detriment", (R. 748-750), Issues as to the exact amount owed on 
each lien by Defendant Wayne Sommer were reserved for trail on the 
merits of each claim, id. 
Trial was held on December 21, 1994, during which Defendant 
Trans Tech sought throughout to rehear the summary judgment motion. 
(See. R. 879-881, 966-974). Plaintiff opposed the oral motion to 
reconsider, in part because he had called down witnesses who would 
have critical import on the issue already decided at summary 
judgment (R. 885-86, 907, 922, 936, 944, 974-976, etc.). The Court 
denied at trial Trans Tech's motion to reconsider the summary 
judgment ruling. (R. 978-979) 
After trial, the Court entered its memorandum decision on 
February 3, 1995, finding in favor of the Plaintiff for the full 
amount of its principal claimed, denying prejudgment interest 
(except from the date of the complaint), and awarding a portion of 
the attorney's fees. Trans Tech was awarded against Wayne Sommer 
the full value of the claimed repairs, interest, and storage fees. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered February 23, 
1995, the same date judgment was entered.(R. 850-859). This appeal 
followed by Trans Tech's notice of appeal having been filed March 
20, 1995. 
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C. Undisputed facts in the record as of the cross motions for 
summary judgment. 
1. On or about March, 1991, Plaintiff (Appellee herein) sold to 
Defendant Wayne Sommer the following vehicle: 
1981 Ford, Model MHVF80, body type-CC 
8 Cylinder, Diesel, VIN-1FDXK84NXBVJ02644 
The sale was for $9,761.00 (including $575.00 tax, $86.00 
license and title fees), for $1,000.00 down and balance in 
monthly payments. (Amend. Complaint R. 6, Verified by Aff. of 
Ted Sommer,R. 378-79; Admitted by Wayne and Jack Sommer in 
Answer, R. 40; Ted Sommer Aff. R. 625-627). 
2. Defendant Wayne Sommer caused title to be issued in the name 
of his father Jack W. Sommer, with seller as lien holder. 
(Aff. of Ted Sommer, R. 625-627; Submission of Documents, 
Title R. 644, verified by T. Sommer 637-638). 
3. It is common practice to purchase a vehicle and title it in 
another or relative's names, e.g. fathers buying for sons and 
daughters, brothers buying trucks for brothers for whom they 
work with, and children purchasing vehicles for their elderly 
parents, and such a request would not have aroused suspicion 
of Plaintiff's employees. (R.626-627). In fact, Wayne had 
previously bought vehicles, one which was placed in his 
father's name (with Jack then present), and a dump truck 
similar to the one at issue which had been titled to a 
partnership. (R. 625-627). 
4. Wayne Sommer signed his own name to the purchase agreement (R. 
11 
62 6) and to the Dealer Registration Record, both reflecting 
Jack W. Sommer to be the titled owner, and Wally Anderson 
(deceased by the time of the suit) notarized the signature of 
Wayne Sommer to the dealer registration record.(R. 363-365). 
Wayne had previously worked for the Plaintiff and was known to 
him and his employees. (R. 625-627). The purchase agreement 
signed by Wayne Sommer provided for retention of title as a 
lien and for attorney's fees in the event of default. (R.637-
641, 645-646). 
Trans Tech was contacted by Defendant Wayne Sommer for repairs 
completed in October, 1992 [sic]( should be 1993, R. 1037), 
original estimate of $7,000.00, but eventual invoice in the 
amount of $10, 432.28. (Trans Tech answer, R. 32). Plaintiff 
first learned of the repairs only after the same had been 
completed. (R. 626). 
Jack Sommer had admitted receiving notice of the registration 
of the truck shortly after the sale, but that it was a year or 
so later before he asked to get off the title. (R. 626). 
Nothing in the record shows that Trans Tech ever checked as to 
who was the registered owner, whether or not there was any 
liens on the title, or that Plaintiff in any way ever 
communicated anything to Trans Tech or its employees prior to 
the repairs having been completed. Trans Tech's sole contact 
was with Wayne Sommer. (R. 32). 
12 
Disputed facts found at trial by the Court. 
At trial it was disputed whether or not the contract was 
entered into on March 13, 1991 as it recites, or was done on 
March 1, 1991 and made in blank as claimed by Defendant Wayne 
Sommer. The Court found the contract was entered into on March 
13, 1991 in the findings. (R. 831). Testimony in support of 
this finding includes that of Dale Mickelson, the sales agent 
of the Plaintiff who handled the subject transaction. (R. 890, 
894-901, Exhibit P-2 admitted in evidence, 918, 920, 921,). 
Appellant ignores this testimony in his claim that it was 
"undisputed facts established by trail testimony" that the 
contract must have been entered into on March 1, 1991 because 
that is the day Wayne Sommer alleges the safety inspection was 
done. First, testimony established that Wayne Sommer "tried 
out" the vehicle sometime prior to sale, and safety inspection 
may have been done then. (R. 890). Second, several witnesses 
cast doubt on the credibility of Wayne Sommer, affirmatively 
stating he had not been honest with them (R. 942, T. Sommer), 
including Trans Tech's owner, Dave Strubble (R. 1067). Third, 
Plaintiff objected at trial to the admission of the inspection 
certificate inasmuch as the document was hearsay, having been 
prepared by a person not in court subject to cross-
examination, and specifically objected to having the document 
admitted to establish any date, Wayne Sommer being unable to 
verify same.(R. 114-115). The document was only received for 
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limited purposes, and the trial Judge stated she would weigh 
in the hearsay factor into consideration of Wayne Sommer's 
testimony on the issue.(R. 114-115).(Appellant suggests 
throughout its brief that this fact is "undisputed", a 
misstatement of the record). 
9. There was a dispute over the balance owed by Wayne Sommer to 
Ted Sommer. (R. 906, 932, 1011-1012). The Court found in favor 
of Plaintiff on this issue. (R. 851). 
10. Contrary to the statement made in Appellant's brief that Wayne 
Sommer never got a copy of the purchase agreement, (Applt. 
Brief, p.16 ), Wayne Sommer acknowledged the possibility that 
he received it and stuck it in the glove box and never looked 
at it again (R.990, 1009). Dale Mickelson, Plaintiff's 
employee, attested that a copy, filled in, was given to Wayne 
Sommer at the time of sale, although he couldn't remember 
exactly. (R. 901).^ 
11. There was great dispute over who requested title to the truck 
be placed in Jack Sommer's name. Dale Mickelson said it was 
Wayne Sommer, (R. 903) that such transactions have been done 
many times before. (R. 904). Dale knew who Jack Sommer was in 
relation to Wayne Sommer. (R. 904). Wayne was living at his 
father's house at the time of the truck purchase. (R. 990). 
There was nothing unusual about the request. (R. 904). There 
was no reason for Mr. Mickelson to put title in Jack Sommer's 
2
 This witness, Dale Mickelson, has deceased subsequent to trial. 
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name unless requested to do so by Wayne. (R. 1095). Wayne 
Sommer stated he did not ask title be placed in his father's 
name on this vehicle, claiming the contract was in blank when 
he signed it. (R. 985). However, Wayne acknowledged other 
vehicles being purchased by or for him and titled in other 
names, one being done by his father, and titled in Jack 
Sommer's name. (R. 135). Wayne changed his testimony as to 
whether or not he told Dale Mickelson to put the truck in his 
fathers name. (R. 1014-1015). The Court found that it was 
Wayne Sommer who placed title in his father's name. (R. 852). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The granting of summary judgment to Plaintiff was well 
supported by both the factual record and the law at the time of 
entry and nothing at trial would have swayed the Court to rule 
otherwise. It was known from the onset that Wayne Sommer requested 
the vehicle be titled in the name of his father, Jack W. Sommer and 
that a lien was reserved by the seller, Appellee herein. The issue 
to be decided at summary judgment was who had priority of lien in 
the vehicle, the seller's lien appearing on title or that of a 
subsequently arising repairman. Though Trans Tech's motion to amend 
the pleading to include fraud was not granted, the Court 
specifically considered and ruled against the Defendant Trans Tech 
as to that purported theory in her Memorandum Decision on Summary 
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Judgment, same having been voluminously briefed by said Defendant. 
The statutes are clear on the iss.io and the Court was correct 
as a matter of law in upholding the seller's priority. Throughout 
this case the Appellant's tactic has been to scream "fraud", 
"false" and "conspiracy" without attempting to show that the 
elements of a fraud case are applicable to these facts. No 
representation was made by Ted Sommer to Trans Tech, so there 
simply is no communication upon which Trans Tech can say it 
detrimentally relied. The status of title is immaterial since Trans 
Tech did not search the record prior to repairing the vehicle. They 
searched it afterwards, and came upon the seller's lien, but 
whether title was in Jack's name or Wayne's name, the repairman is 
still in second position, and thus the distinction is "immaterial" 
for purposes of summary judgment. Wayne Sommer had possession of 
the vehicle, which is all that is necessary to create a valid 
mechanic's lien, irrespective of Jack's titled ownership. 
Something more than mere characterizations of evidence and 
events and repetitious use of the word fraud is necessary to make 
out such a case. Rather, the facts must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that each element is met, and such was not nor 
can not be made out under the facts of the present case. 
2. Under Utah law, Plaintiff/seller's retianed title lien is 
valid where as here, said lien is disclosed on the title. While 
there may not have been absolutely perfect conduct exercized by 
Plaintiff's employees, it is, at most, mere irregularity and does 
16 
not warrant non-recognition of the lien. The summary judgment was 
warranted on the state of the record then existing as a matter of 
law. 
3. Denial of the motion to reconsider summary judgment was 
appropriate because of unfair surprise to the Plaintiff, and 
because Trans Tech was not proffering additional facts for the 
summary judgment record by way of affidavit or proffer of counsel, 
but rather they wanted a trial on the decided issues to see what 
evidence they might come up with if the witnesses were examined as 
to such potential issues. In short, having lost at summary judgment 
they wanted authority form the Court to engage in a fishing 
expedition into the facts to see what, if anything, they could turn 
up which might change the Court's decision. Such a procedure would 
make a mockery of summary judgments and destroy the very purpose of 
such motions, i.e. to save time and expense by reducing the issues. 
4. Denial of the Motion to amend the pleading was not an abuse of 
discretion, same having been filed shortly before trial, allowing 
amendment would certainly have required postponement of trial, and 
the essential facts were known from the onset of the case. Though 
Trans Tech attempted to argue this was a new "fact based" defense, 
it was in reality just a new theory of the case, and was argued 
below that it was a forgery of Jack's name to the registration 
record, which theory was not supported by facts then in evidence 
(or subsequently determined at trial). 
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5. The factual findings at trial were well supported by the 
evidence, although disputed. Appellant's attempts, without 
authority cited, to treat the Court's factual findings as 
reviewable under a de novo standard is wholly contrary to Utah law. 
By applying the proper standard of review to the challenges 
raised, the judgment of the Court below should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
1. The Circuit Court did not err in granting a motor vehicle 
seller's motion for summary judgment on the issue of a seller's 
title retaining lien having priority over a subsequent mechanic's 
lien where the mechanic/lienholder sought to amend its pleading and 
raise new issues not factually supported by the record, which 
motion was heard concurrent with the summary judgment motions only 
nine days prior to trial. 
The issue before the Court below on cross motions for summary 
judgment was the priority of lien claims to a motor vehicle (1981 
dump truck) of the vehicle seller with lien appearing on title vis 
a vis a subsequently arising repairman's lien. The original brief 
filed in July, 1994, by Plaintiff made it clear that Utah statutes 
and administrative rules of the Department of Motor Vehicles gave 
priority to the lien on title. Trans Tech's first response was that 
discovery was not complete, and Plaintiff, apparently in 
18 
recognition of this claim, filed no additional papers on the motion 
for some two months( See R.341-42). Trans Tech itself submitted the 
motion for decision in late October, 1994, having received 
discovery responses from everyone except Wayne Sommer (who had also 
not responded to Plaintiff's discovery) and then in mid November 
filed its motion to amend, followed shortly thereafter by its 
motion for summary judgment on the theory that Jack Sommerfs name 
had been forged to the Dealer registration certificate and that was 
fraud. 
There was nothing in the record showing Wayne Sommer to have 
signed his father's name. Rather the record showed Wayne Sommer 
signed his own name and it was Wayne Sommer's name that was 
notarized (and known to the employees of Plaintiff). (R. 363-365). 
This information was submitted into the record October 25, 1994, by 
Plaintiff, but was essentially disclosed to Trans Tech in response 
to discovery served in June, 1994, and placed in the record by 
Trans Tech itself, (R. 228-253; See also submission of documents, 
R. 346-365, verified by Dale Mickelson 310-330). 
Although Trans Tech claims in this appeal "newly discovered 
evidence" justifying their late raising of the fraud issue, it was 
plainly disclosed in the Complaint itself that Wayne Sommer bought 
3
 Wayne Sommer personally appeared at the summary judgment hearing on December 12, 
1994, and acknowledged in open court that he signed his own name to the documents; At that 
time he made no claim that the purchase agreement was blank when he signed it, though the 
suggestion was raised at trial by Mr. Kinney's examination of Wayne Sommer. Appellant chose 
not to have the summary judgment hearing transcribed, and the rules appear to place the burden 
of making sure the record is complete on the appellant. U.R.A.P. 11 (e) (2). 
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the truck and for reasons of his own requested title be placed in 
his father's name. The only thing that was "new" was that Trans 
Tech, having deduced from Plaintiff's memorandum that it was in 
second position, needed to somehow void the lien. The new legal 
theory arose not from the facts, but from necessity, i.e. fraud 
claims appeared to be the way to avoid the consequence of 
Plaintiff's prior lien. 
The trial court could have, from mere lateness of the raising 
of the issue alone, completely discarded the question. She did not. 
In her memorandum decision on summary judgment, she specifically 
ruled "Pursuant to U.C.A. 41-la-601 through 604, plaintiff 
perfected its security interest in the subject vehicle. There is no 
evidence of any fraud occurring in the transaction, as the 
undisputed facts show the defendant, Wayne Sommer, to be the 
purchaser-debtor of the vehicle, and the same person who signed his 
name to the purchase documents. Although he placed the vehicle in 
his father's name, he made no material representation on which 
Transmission Tech relied to its detriment." (R. 749). 
Thus, the court below did consider the fraud argument, at 
least for defensive purposes and concluded it was without merit. 
This Court should concur. To establish a fraud claim, a party must 
establish (1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) 
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) 
for the purpose of inducing the other to act upon it; (6) that the 
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other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) 
to his injury and damage. Andalex Rescourses, Inc. v. Meyers, 871 
P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994) (citing to Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1980)). 
Appellant has not in its opening brief to this Court, nor in 
its brief to the court below, nor in its proposed amendment to its 
answer and counterclaim, ever made even a feeble attempt to show 
how each element is satisfied under the facts of this case. Rather, 
the strategy appears to be to shout repetitiously the words "fraud" 
and "false", hoping somehow to make out a case without addressing 
the elements thereof. Appellee argued below that the elements of a 
fraud case are simply missing in this case. 
First, the record is undisputed that neither Ted Sommer nor 
his employees ever made any communication to Trans Tech prior to 
Trans Tech having completed its repairs to the truck (in fact they 
only learned of the repairs sometime later when Trans Tech called 
them trying to collect on its bill, R.626). Retention of a lien for 
the purchase money of a vehicle is no basis for liability. U.C.A. 
§ 70A-9-317 states: 
The mere existence of a security interest or authority 
given to the debtor to dispose of or use collateral does 
not impose contract or tort liability upon the secured 
party for the debtor's acts or omissions. 
Trans Tech's own answer confirms it was induced to do the repairs 
by Wayne Sommer, not Plaintiff. 
It is true that Wally Anderson, part time bookkeeper of 
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Plaintiff, notarized the signature of Wayne Sommer to the owner 
affidavit on the dealer registration certificate, and typed in the 
information to the form. It is also true that the form says each 
named owner must sign and that Jack Sommer did not sign that form. 
However, the record also reveals that it is not an uncommon 
practice in vehicle sales that one member of a family signs and has 
vehicles titled in another. (R. 626-27). The UCC contemplated such 
scenarios. U.C.A. §70A-9-112 states: 
Where Collateral Is Not Owned By Debtor 
Unless otherwise agreed, when a secured party knows 
that collateral is owned by a person who is not the 
debtor, the owner of the collateral is entitled to 
receive from the secured party any surplus under Section 
9-502(2) or under 9-504(1), and is not liable for the 
debt or for any deficiency after resale, and he has the 
same rights as the debtor 
(a) to receive statements under Section 9-208; 
(b) to receive notice of and to object to a 
secured part's proposal to retain the 
collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness 
under Section 9-505; 
(c) to redeem the collateral under Section 9-
506; 
(d)to obtain injunctive relief.... 
(e) to recover losses caused to him..•• 
In short the statute sets out a comprehensive plan for dealing 
with just this scenario. Debtor Wayne Sommer owes the debt. Owner 
Jack Sommer is not liable for the debt, gets any surplus on 
repossession and sale, but is not liable for any deficiency. Both 
owner and debtor are entitled to notices and may object to any plan 
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, or may sue in 
court. Were it not for such a comprehensive scheme, creditors would 
be reluctant to sell to debtors who wanted to buy collateral to 
give as gifts or use it in their corporations. Such is not the case 
22 
however. When a seller, as here, knows that the item will belong to 
someone other than the debtor, he takes on a small additional 
burden, such as notices and duty to account after repossession and 
sale, but the UCC doesn't void his purchase money lien. 
If, as Trans Tech appears to argue herein, all liens are void 
per-se where this dealer registration form was not signed by the 
titled owner, there must be a lot of invalid liens in the state of 
Utah. Parents routinely buy vehicles for children, sometimes as 
surprise gifts deliberately not wanting them to know of the 
purchase until a later time (birthday, graduation, etc.) and, 
unless they have the cash on hand, the debt/lien remains with the 
parents though the car is for the child. Family members in business 
together often purchase vehicles, titling same for various reasons 
in one or another's name. Finally, in the husband and wife 
scenario, titles are routinely placed in both names whether or not 
both are present to sign the registration certificate. 
In this case, it is difficult to read Wayne Sommer's name. But 
there is no evidence in the record that any registration 
certificate has ever been rejected and sent back by the Department 
of Motor Vehicles for want of a family member's signature thereon. 
The statement on the form that all owners must sign is just that, 
an instruction on a form, not a statute, not a regulation or a 
legislative enactment. Its an instruction on a form. 
The U.C.C. recognizes that trade usage and course of dealing 
is admissible evidence. U.C.A. §70A-l-205. Custom in the trade 
routinely deviates from the form instructions with respect to 
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family/business members. Jack and Wayne Sommer had previously 
bought vehicles from Ted Sommer. One, bought for Wayne was titled 
in Jack's name, at request of Jack. Others Wayne has routinely 
titled in business partnerships or others names. There is nothing 
"false" or reckless with respect to Plaintiff's employees in this 
case 
There is no evidence Plaintiff intended to induce Trans Tech 
to do anything. Trans Tech wasn't even in the picture at the time 
of the sale. Their repairs were two (2) years later. How could Ted 
Sommer have intended to induce them? 
Trans Tech offered no proof, either at summary judgment or at 
trial that anyone, not even Wayne Sommer made any representation as 
to title, liens, registration, or other legal ownership prior to 
the repairs. Trans Tech offered no proof it searched the motor 
vehicle records, title records or otherwise prior to doing the 
repairs, so how was it induced to act? 
Finally, what is the damage caused by the alleged 
misrepresentation? Whether or not the vehicle was titled in the 
name of Jack W. Sommer, or Wayne Sommer, is irrelevant to a 
repairman's lien. The repairman's lien arises from the possessory 
use of the vehicle brought into the shop. U.C.A. §38-2-3 provides: 
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or bestow 
labor upon, any article of personal property at the 
request of the owner or other person entitled to 
possession thereof shall have a lien upon such article 
for the reasonable value of the labor performed and the 
materials furnished and used in the making of such 
article or in the altering or repairing the same, and may 
retain possession thereof the amount so due is paid; 
provided such lien and right to possession shall be 
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subject and subordinate to the rights and interests of 
any secured parties in such personal property unless the 
secured party has requested such person to make, alter or 
repair or bestow labor upon such property. [emphasis 
added] 
Thus, Trans Tech is entitled to a second position lien only. 
Their second position lien is valid irrespective of whether or not 
Jack Sommer or Wayne Sommer is the titled owner, but their lien is 
inferior to that of the Plaintiff because Plaintiff never got paid 
for the truck and retained his lien on the title. It is not the 
status of title which injures them; It is the fact that they, 
without checking for liens, put $10,400.00 into a truck not worth 
that much.4 
In short, there are no facts which would support a claim for 
fraud. The proposed amended complaint does not even plead a case 
for such, and fraud must be plead specifically. Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P. 
Leave to file an amended complaint should be denied when the moving 
party seeks to assert a new claim that is legally insufficient or 
futile. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Meyers, supra at 1046; see also, 
Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92-93 (Utah 1992). 
Further, fraud requires proof by a clear and convincing 
evidence standard, a matter which the trial court was obligated to 
consider on the cross motions for summary judgment. Andalex 
Resources, Inc., v. Meyers, supra at 1046-47; Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
(1986)(a party must make a sufficient showing to establish the 
4
 Public auction held subsequent to the filing of this appeal in satisfaction of Plaintiffs lien 
brought only a $7,000.00 high bid for the truck, less costs of sale and preparation costs for sale. 
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existence of all essential elements of a claim on which that part 
would bear the burden of proof at trial); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 
Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1986)(a party must prove with clear and convincing evidence at the 
summary judgment stage if that is the burden required at trial); 
see also, Robinson vf mtermountcun Health cgre, 740 p.2d 262, 264 
(Utah App. 1987); Applied Genetics, Int'l, Inc. , v, First 
Affiliated Securities, Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.1990). 
Trans Tech failed to make a showing of even a scintilla of 
evidence on several of the elements of its proposed fraud case, 
much less sustain its burden by clear and convincing evidence. It 
would have been legal error for the Court to have denied 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment when presented with a fraud 
defense as deficient as the one before it and the Court below was 
obligated to deny the motion to amend the pleading where they were 
deficient on their face. 
Cases cited by Appellant are not on point. The only case even 
remotely relevant is Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P. 2d 
951 (Utah App. 1993), wherein in anticipation of financing by a 
bank for buyer to purchase a trailer, vehicle dealer Lake Philgas 
had purchaser Bennet execute a security agreement and a dealer 
registration certificate showing dealer as a lienholder on title 
and Bennet as owner. Bank financing fell through, and Bennett 
retained possession of the trailer under a lease agreement with 
dealer. Later, judgment creditor Valley Bank attempted execution on 
the trailer, after learning from dealer about the failed financing. 
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The Court ruled that despite title designation of Bennet as owner, 
judgment creditor could not execute on trailer inasmuch as it had 
learned prior to execution that Bennett was a mere lessee. In other 
words, while it was true that the security agreement failed for 
want of eventual consummation of sale, the Court recognized the 
realities of ownership and interests despite title. 
In this case, despite whomever Wayne Sommer designated as 
title owner, Ted Sommer reserved a security interest on that title, 
giving clear notice to the world at the time Trans Tech commenced 
work of Sommer1s claimed interest. Trans Tech certainly knew of the 
lien by the time it attempted repairman's foreclosure and the 
realities of the case support Appellee's lien. 
The other cases cited are not apropos.5 In Automobile Accept. 
Corp. v. Universal C.I.T. Cr. Corp., 139 A.2d 683 (Md. App. 1958) 
there is unquestioned fraud by the dealer who induced the 
purchaser to sign multiple conditional sale contracts, sold each 
contract to separate financiers, not disclosing the adverse 
security interests. That presents a case of dealer fraud, obviously 
voiding the lien. Misrepresentation of false fact, inducement, 
reliance, injury, all the elements clearly and convincingly arising 
from the facts. Dissault v. Evans, 201 P.2d 822 (Idaho 1953) and 
Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday, 30 N.E. 2d 1002 (Ohio 1940) are 
not situations involving a seller's title retaining lien, but 
5
 Appellant cites many times to Meyer v American General Corp. in its brief, see e.g. 
pgsAl,42, but each time uses only supra as the citation. This counsel couldn.t find the actual 
citation anywhere in its brief, not even in the table of authorities. Without a citation, it is difficult 
to review the case and respond. 
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rather are situations where a partner or association member 
attempted, without any apparent or actual authority, to encumber 
property that belonged to the partnership or association. In this 
case, if Wayne Sommer had merely came into Plaintiff's yard with a 
truck already titled to his father and attempted to grant a lien 
therein to purchase a different truck, no question Jack Sommerfs 
signature would have been expressly required by Plaintiff's 
employees. The title itself would have required that. Here, on the 
other hand, Plaintiff already had title, wouldn't release same 
without payment or lien, and whose name the purchaser wished title 
be placed in was a mere accommodation to the customer, as title 
would be returned to Plaintiff from Motor Vehicles so long as the 
lien remained unpaid. As shown earlier, by virtue of past dealings 
and familial relations, Wayne had apparent if not actual authority 
to so request. 
Drettmann v. Marchand, 337 Mich. 1, 59 N.W. 2d 56 (1953) is a 
case where a claimed lienholder to a motor vehicle had not filed 
his interest of record on the title and lost vis a vis an auction 
company who sold the vehicles unaware of Plaintiff's interest. 
Although there was fraud in the inducement by the dealer who took 
the vehicles to the auction under promise to return and pay as soon 
as same were sold, the basis for the decision was the lack of a 
lien appearing on the title. It is difficult to understand how this 
case supports the conclusion cited by the Appellant in his brief. 
Appellant also complains the sale contract violated the 
statute of frauds. First, this defense was not plead, either in its 
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original answer or in the proposed amended answer. The statute of 
frauds is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the 
pleading else it is waived. Philips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 
(Utah 1983). Though argued in one of its briefs below, the issue 
was not addressed by the trial court, and was not properly raised 
for consideration thereby. See, e.g. State v. Mickelson, 848 P. 2d 
677 (Utah App. 1992) (issue not framed by the pleading was not 
preserved for consideration on appeal); see also, Ong Intf1 (USA)) , 
Inc. v. llth Ave. Corp. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
Second, it is inapplicable to the case at bar. The operative 
statute, U.C.A. §70A-2-201 provides in relevant part: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a 
contract for sale of goods for the price of $500 or more 
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless 
there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the parties and 
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or 
by his authorized agent or broker* A writing is not 
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a 
term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable 
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown 
in such writing. 
(2) 
(3) a Contract which does not satisfy the requirements of 
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable 
(a)... 
(b) if the part against whom enforcement is sought admits 
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a 
contract for sale was made,... 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made 
and accepted or which have been received and accepted 
(sec.2-606). 
In the present case, both Jack W. Sommer and Wayne Sommer 
admitted the contract to buy the truck in their answer, and 
admitted that Wayne Sommer had received the truck. Trans Tech did 
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not admit the contract in its answer, but it was not a party to the 
contract, and admission by it was not necessary to satisfaction of 
the statute of frauds. 
Trans Tech further argues irregularities in Plaintiff's brief 
as a grounds for reversal. It is ironical, inasmuch as Trans Tech 
itself failed to comport with Rule 401 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Almost all of Trans Tech's briefs were over length, 
without permission of the Court, and it too filed briefs as of the 
day of hearing. Appellee's position is that the trial court went 
out of its way to afford all parties adequate time, more than 
adequate briefing opportunities, and a full hearing on their 
respective claims, including numerous issues raised by Trans Tech 
which not plead or properly at issue in the case. Neither Wayne 
Sommer or Jack Sommer filed anything in opposition to the summary 
judgment motions, yet the court deferred for trial issues as to 
amount owed when such issues were raised only by the pleading. It 
is difficult comprehend how more fair to all she could have been. 
Further, Defendant made its own motion for summary judgment 
essentially arguing the facts were clear. In fact, they were so 
impressed by their own work, they filed a Rule 11 motion against 
Plaintiff without even waiting for a ruling on summary judgment, a 
brief replete with name calling and scandalous outrage. (R. 756-
766) . 
There was no error in the granting of summary judgment on the 
issue of lien priority under the circumstances of this case. 
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2. The Court, as a matter of law, properly ruled at summary 
judgment that the title retaining lien of a motor vehicle seller 
was valid and had priority despite title having been placed in the 
buyer's fathers name, with seller's lien appearing thereon, where 
the issues of unconscionability and estoppel were first raised only 
after the ruling and same do not appear in the pleadings. 
The Court reviewing a motion for summary judgment applies the 
same standard as that of the court below, Briggs v. Holocomb, supra. 
Appellant, in its opening brief, argues that the summary judgment 
granted Plaintiff wasn't proper as because of issues of estoppel 
and unconscionability. 
First, as to the estoppel issue, that claim was never raised 
below/ Issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally 
not considered by Utah appellate courts. See, Ong Int'l (U.S.A.)r 
Inc., v. 11th Ave. Corp., supra, (also cited in Appellant's brief); 
Ashcroft y. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah App.),cert, 
den. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
Second, estoppel must be pleaded or it is waived. Matter of 
Estate of Justheimf -824 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1991). Third, estoppel 
is only present where words or conduct by one party leads another 
to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the 
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. Perkins v. 
Great-West Life Assur. Co.f 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991). As has 
6
 Appellant avoids the burden imposed on it by U.R. A.P. Rule 24 by simply ignoring this 
requirement throughout its brief. 
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been pointed out supra, in issue 1, Plaintiff/Appellant never 
communicated anything to Trans Tech- Plaintiff has consistently 
maintained its claim to a lien throughout. Trans Tech changed its 
strategies and theories of the case both below, and again on this 
appeal, but Plaintiff has remained steadfast. 
Trans Tech was not induced to repair the vehicle by Appellant, 
rather it was induced by Defendant Wayne Sommer. Appellant's injury 
arises not from the actions of Ted Sommer, but from its own 
inaction in failing to check the status of title and liens prior to 
doing an alleged $10,400.00 in repairs to a seven or eight thousand 
dollar truck. A party claiming estoppel cannot rely on the 
representations or acts if they are contrary to his knowledge of 
truth or if he had means by which with reasonable diligence he 
could have ascertained the truth. Perking v. Great-West Life Agsur. 
Co., supra 
In this case Trans Tech had only to pick up the phone. The 
Department of Motor Vehicles is available regular business hours. 
They had the truck, they knew the VIN number. They could have 
requested a deposit from Wayne Sommer before extending such a great 
sum on a 1981 Truck. They were in a position to avoid this matter. 
Ted Sommer, having already sold the truck reserving a lien, had no 
opportunity to know of the Trans Tech repairs until after it was 
already done. 
With respect to unconscionability, that too is not in the 
pleadings or summary judgment arguments, and was not raised until 
Trans Tech attempted to raise it at trial, with timely objection 
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made by Appellee, which objection was sustained. (R. 68-70). The 
contract was admitted by all the parties to it in the pleadings by 
virtue of the Answer of Jack and Wayne Sommer. The terms were 
admitted. The only disputes were balance remaining owed and whether 
or not Wayne Sommer requested title be in Jack Sommerfs name 
(authority to do so was not denied in the pleadings, just whether 
or not that was what Wayne did). 
The standards for a claim of unconscionability are well 
addressed in Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranchf 706 P.2d 
1028 (Utah 1985) and applying those tests it is apparent no claim 
of unconscionability is present. Wayne Sommer was not 
underprivileged, unsophisticated or illiterate. The language of the 
purchase agreement, while on the back of the form, is plain, 
readable (at least on the original copies), without boilerplate and 
the parties had negotiated several contracts before. In fact, 
testimony shows that it was Wayne Sommer who had been taking 
advantage of Plaintiff, and not the other way around.(R. 78). 
Appellant again argues that the purchase agreement was blank 
at the time that it was signed by Wayne Sommer (they have to 
maintain this position otherwise Wayne Sommer is not being honest 
when he says he didn't request it be titled in his father's name). 
That argument was not raised at the summary judgment hearing. 
Further, it is contrary to evidence introduced at trial. (R. 890, 
894-901). Second, Wayne Sommer was, essentially, attempting to 
impeach his own pleadings because the contract had been admitted. 
Finally, the Court concluded that the contract was entered 
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into on March 13, 1991, and that Wayne Sommer was the one that 
reguested title be placed in his father's name based on the 
undisputed state of the record then before it, and found similarly 
after trial against Wayne on the amount of the balance owing. As a 
matter of law, the Court ruled on the record before it at the time 
of the hearing on summary judgment, and on the issues then raised 
in the pleadings and subseguently raised issues should not be 
considered as a basis for second guessing the Court below, 
3. After granting summary judgment for a motor vehicle seller on 
the on cross motions for declaratory judgment on issue of lien 
priority vis a vis a subsequent repairman's lien, the Court did 
not err in refusing to reconsider at a trial on other issues, the 
previously granted motion where, in reliance on the order of 
summary judgment, the prevailing party was not prepared to 
relitigate the issues already decided by the motion. 
There is no "motion for reconsideration" of a summary judgment 
ruling provided for in the rules of civil procedure. Utah State 
Employee's Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 462 P.2d 1,3 
(1970); Tracy vf University pf Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 
1980); But see, Watkiss v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1991)(motion treated as a motion for a new trial under Rule 59). 
Second, assuming arguendo that the judge should have considered 
it as a Rule 59 motion, such motion should have been accompanied 
with affidavits or proffers as to "new " evidence to be considered. 
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A review of this oral motion raised only at trial with no prior 
notice shows that Trans Tech didn't know of any evidence not 
already in the record, but were merely trying to use trial as a 
"fishing expedition" in the hopes of finding such evidence, cf. 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1990) rev'd 
on other grounds, 827 P. 2d 212 (Utah 1992) (purpose of affidavits 
under Rule 56(f) is to show court precisely what facts additional 
discovery is expected to produce and how such facts are material to 
the motion, not to allow "fishing expedition" in the hopes of 
avoiding judgment). 
Here, Trans Tech had adequate time to respond to the motion, 
in fact almost six months. Trans Tech itself submitted Plaintiff's 
motion for decision. Nothing more than simple dissatisfaction with 
the ruling was proffered as a basis for the reconsideration. 
Further, Plaintiff's counsel had already called down witnesses 
critical to the fraud issues Trans Tech wanted to reconsider, 
specifically the Department of Motor Vehicle investigators whom 
Plaintiff would believed would testify as to the customary practice 
of family members titling vehicles in one and another's name (R. 
885) . 
Here the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. Allowing a party who is dissatisfied with a summary 
judgment ruling to reopen the matter at a trial on other issues 
defeats the purpose of summary judgments. Rule 56 is intended to 
discover whether a controversy can be settled as a matter of law, 
thereby saving both the court and litigants time trouble and 
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expense of trial. See, e.g. Rich v. McG^ern, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 
1976). 
4. The court did not err in denying a motion to amend the 
pleading to add additional counterclaims and cross claims for fraud 
and conspiracy, where such claims had not been previously raised in 
the pleading, where the substantive facts for the new theories were 
available from the onset of the case, the motion was made only one 
month before trial, made after the matter was set for trial, and 
additional discovery would not have been feasible within the time 
remaining for trial. 
As was stated in jQeinert v. Kimball Elevator QQ., 854 P.2d 
1025 (Utah App. 1993): 
The decision to allow leave to amend a 
complaint is discretionary with the trial 
court. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 
(Utah 1984); Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 
248 (Utah 1983). Utah Courts have focused on 
three factors when deciding whether to grant a 
motion to amend:(1) the timeliness of the 
motion; (2) the justification given by the 
movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting 
prejudice to the responding party. Regional 
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 
1216 (Utah App.1989). In Westley v. Farmer's 
lns? Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983), 
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's refusal to grant leave to amend 
because ,f[a]n amendment would certainly have 
delayed the trial and the substance of 
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full 
year earlier when plaintiff discussed it in 
his deposition." 
Kljenert, supra at 1028. 
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In the present case, the essential fact that Wayne Sommer 
placed title in the name of his father was known from the onset of 
the case, and acknowledged in discovery documents served in June, 
1994. Delaying filing of the motion to amend until mid November, 
19 94, was not excused and, inasmuch as hearing on the motion was 
not had until December, 1994, would unquestionably have delayed 
trial. The truck itself wasn't getting any more valuable with age 
and thus delay would have been detrimental. 
Trans Tech attempts to say it didn't have all discovery, but 
doesn't point to any specific responses that would have been new to 
the case. 
Finally, its proposed amendment for fraud fails to state a 
claim under Utah law, not being specifically plead and not having 
the elements required to make out a fraud claim. Leave to file an 
amended complaint should be denied when the moving party seeks to 
assert a new claim that is legally insufficient or futile. Andalex 
Resources, Inc. v. Meyers, supra at 1046. 
5. The trial court did not err in finding at trial that the 
purchase contract was entered into on March 13,1991, was agreed 
upon as to amount to be paid, that it was Defendant Wayne Sommer 
who requested title be in his father's name, and in denying 
Defendant's claim of "credits" where no evidence was offered as to 
the specifics of the alleged credits. 
Although Appellant maintains they are reviewable under a de-
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novo standard of review, without citation therefor, what is really 
being attempted is to attack :ain findings of fact made by the 
court after trial on the amoun ^ssue, findings not material to the 
summary judgment, then with Appellant's own findings different from 
those found by the court, it attempts to argue material issues of 
fact present at the summary judgment. These factual issues were 
fully explored at trial, and although conflicting evidence was 
submitted, the court found in favor of Plaintiff's version of the 
facts. Unless these findings are clearly erroneous, the appellate 
court must sustain them on appeal. Alta Indust. Ltd. v. Hurstf 846 
P. 2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).Factual findings are clearly erroneous 
if they are "not adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Dale Mickelson testified that at on March 13, 1991, the 
purchase contact was signed by Wayne Sommer and the sale was 
consummated. He testified that the purchase contract was filled in 
at the time it was signed. (R. 890, 894-901, Exhibit P-2 admitted, 
918, 920, 921). Trans Tech disagrees with this finding because it 
was attempting to raise new issues at trial, i.e. 
unconscionability. They rest their conclusion that it was 
undisputed that the contract was signed in blank on March 1, 1991 
on the testimony of Wayne Sommer and the inspection certificate; 
exhibit D-2. However, several witnesses agreed that Wayne Sommer 
wasn't honest, including Trans Tech's owner, Dave Strubble.(R. 942; 
1067). Third, exhibit D-2 was admitted over hearsay objection and 
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due to lack of cross examination of the person who prepared it we 
really can't be sure as to its accuracy or authenticity. 
There was a dispute as to whether or not Wayne Sommer ever got 
a copy of the purchase agreement. Appellant maintains that the 
record is clear that he didn't, but Wayne Sommer himself 
acknowledged he may have. (R. 990, 1009). Inasmuch as the contract 
was admitted by his pleadings, this issue was irrelevant. 
There was great dispute as to whether or not Wayne Sommer 
requested title be in his father's name. Dale Mickelson attested he 
had,(R. 903), and that there would be no other reason for so 
titling the vehicle.(R. 1095). Wayne Sommer testified he did not, 
but was inconsistent in his statements. (R. 1014-1015). The Court 
had already found on summary judgment that Wayne Sommer made the 
request, but ruled again at trial in favor of Plaintiff on the 
issue.(R. 852). 
Each of the challenged factual findings is adequately 
supported by evidence in the record and Appellant's conclusory 
statements to the contrary, without even a superficial attempt to 
marshall the evidence as required, does not change the facts as 
found by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment ruling of the trial court below 
concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff's purchase money lien 
in the truck had priority over the repairman, Trans Tech, should be 
affirmed. The rulings denying Trans Tech's motion for 
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reconsideration and motion to amend the pleadings were well within 
the sound discretion of the tiial court and should be affirmed. The 
factual findings are supported by adequate, if not the great 
weight, of the evidence and the judgment entered below should be 
affirmed. 
The relief requested by trans tech is wholly inappropriate. 
First, the priority of lien is essentially a moot question inasmuch 
as the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff/seller was not appealed 
by Defendants Wayne Sommer and Jack Sommer, and Appellant took no 
steps either before the Circuit Court, or this Court, to stay 
execution of the judgment. The truck having been sold at public 
auction in partial satisfaction of Plaintiff's judgment, the 
repairman's lien is forever gone. 
With respect to the claim for monetary damages, there was no 
legally sufficient pleading below upon which a fraud case could be 
premised, much less clear and convincing evidence to support such 
claim. For the reasons as set forth in this brief, the judgment of 
the Circuit Court, Honorable Sandra N. Pueler presiding, should be 
affirmed. 
DATED THIS 16th day of July, 1995. 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
Attorney for the Appellee, Ted Sommer 
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*et)ic\i< at a*-./ time wiir--;ut creating .jn> obligation an the part or either -\M Dealer or the Manufacturer, to mato 
corr&spotwTtq cnanges •'•5 the vehicle covered by this agreement either before or subsequent to the delivery of such vehicle 
to th«* p .u rcnw. 
of the d^airi 
NOvV*R?iArjr!?3 E/PnESSEQQ* IMPLIED. ARE MADE OR W'LL BE DEEMEDTO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER THt 
DFALER OR T-*. M^>4U-ACTU^Efl O* THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNlSHEC 
MrHEUNDE*. E>CSP"nr*'s ONLY THE CURRENT PRtNTEC WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE 
CH/xSSIo.VVHiCH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHIOUViL*. 
Be: DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME Or DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS. SUCH vVAPRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY iN LiEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
INCLUDING. BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY Or MERCHANT ABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A 
-ARTICULAR PURPOSE. AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES 
AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS 
NO WARRANTIES. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. ARE MADE BY THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES 
OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FUfiMSMEO HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY THE 
DEALER FOR SUCH U5Z.0 MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN 
WRITING. IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF. 
'••• n case rhe vehicle c o v e r t fcy this agreement *<> a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made as lo 
the extent such vehicle has- Peen used, regardless of the mileage shown on the speedometer of said used vehicle. 
f>. Ui m« event thar a becomes necessary tor Dealer to enforce any of the terms and conditions of this agreement, purchaser 
zqwes to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs 
3 Th»s agreements Non-Transferable 
10 LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOP BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IK 
THIS AGREEMENT 
11 PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is IB years of age or older. 
12 Title to the vehicle is to remain vested m the Dealer until purchase price is paid in full; purchaser grants rodealer tsocurir 
interest »n the subject vehicle to secure said payment in full* 
*:* N:> agreement, verbal or otnervme. not contained in this agreement will be recognized... 
iwtfnn C W W f l . U > , JJ I^ f lTW 
&HICLE "-• •"••' TITLE l u e o i o e i r : ; ; ^ / . : . ' . :,. 
UTE" ISSUED o« /ou /9 i v':>^^-.>K!'..-?I^^-J.\^''.;••::,..,• 
ICEHSE•;••' 962UCN A 
0929195021 '.':•'• v 
< v \ ^ 
•"a 6 <ie' 
^>s. .-"' > \ , : .'? MAILING AOORESS" 
V v ^ t SOMERS 'AUTO WRECKING': 
J ; ' : - I 6«7 W 33*00 SOUTH ; ,^ 
* ) ^ t ; " S L C ' U T J 8«119 / " ; " ^ 
i-'",-f"^' - j '"' • ' • * • - ' . ' / ' ' i • / ' • " . . > ' " ' ' VEHICLE IDENTIFICAnoN 
Wl§j-; w •:/•<••••: •"';,./.. . '^:;v:/•; **£">/#*>\)?&-%\ 
IN-lFDIK8«NXBVJ026tJt»V I • / ' * , i ^ 
EAR-81 HAKE-FORD MODEL~flHVF80 
YLr! 8'; FUEL-D^ v M--^:v- W^-" •""• 
..:?. > .-t-' 
M ^^**>& 
.'State Tax Commissi' . 
$*! Motor Vehicle Division 
1095 Motor A,.; 
Salt L i k e City, titer, c - ' • 
NAME AM? ADORESS Of.•VEHICLE OWNER(S) 
/5'OHIiM JACK..^H,V;|/#t^ V ; £ W f e r ; ; • G ; v ^ ^ i iAME -
' ^ % " 1 8 6 r DSONN LH , . 
=VV®*^:SS;UEN-HOLDER ; ^ i7v5I#v' "//H • 
^J^pSOMJBRS^ AUTO' ^WRECKI ISG^* / / ! 
WRESS;^ 6 4 7 w 3300 SOUTH ^ ^ ^ • v - ' 
i&i^tk^s Ltrufc-mMi^ n T^B a 11 ? •. \ t
SX3NATUREOF 
LIENREUI'V^'-'; 
UEN-HOLDER R&E$>JN'5 INTEREST 
^ - , 
THE "MOTOR VEHICLE/ DIVISION, '•'pursuant r to. the laws'of the^State^^^^ pernor, 
named above has been ^ and that this 
vehicle is subject to the lien and encumbrance, rf]anyl herein set forth. r-L?'•/.'•: -:!.? $ ^ % ^ 
FORM Tt>127 REV.7/89 r .,-""•• " I " ' — r ^ J Z::- 'f± 4 j f X < ^ K ^ l l^L^ ^  ^ v / >-- - - ^ f ^ ; 3..r"/^ i^; ®^ fe^ / 
OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE 
For the Sates/Purchase pnce specked herein, I (we) the undersigned owner(s) hereby transfer, 
convey and assign ail rights tttle and interest to the vehicle described on the face hereof to 
the Nbw Owner named below and warrant the title to be free and deaf of all encumbrances, 
except a lien in favor of the person identified below as New ben - Holder, if any 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW REQUIRE THAT THE OWNER STATE THE MjLEAQE UPON J R A N S F ^ ^ ^ W N E R W A VEHICLE 
FAILURE TO COMPLETE A STATEMENT, OR PROVIDING A FALSE ^TEMENT^MAY RESULT IN FlNESjAjyfflffi IMPRISONMENT 
3/r r-urii/HAOt: F H t l F 
E$ VA^oolvod 
- Transfer or / Company Nome 
(Name must be printed) 
whose current address is Streets. 
EJy Owner/Authorized Agent (Name must be prated) 
UDOMETER READING 
-L 
City- -S t . JZV- miles (no term.. 
hereby certify that on the date of this statement the odometer reads the mileage here recorded, &n#3fcat,(o the best of m/ 
and belief this reflects the actual mileage for this vehicie, unless one of the following is checked 
C ) Reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the odometer mechanical limits 
(" ) Is NOT the actual mileage for this vehicle WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY 
X - , 19 , 
Signature of Transferor in ink (must bo notarized) 
Signature of Joint Transferor (must be notarized) 
"Subscribed and sworn to this day of 
NEW OWNER (Name must be printed) 
NAME 
ADDRESS. 
CHTY 
K 
-ST.. 
. , 1 9 . 
Notary 
Seal 
Signature of Notary Public or M V Examiner 
NEWiJEN-HOLOER (Name must befrfnfeft 
NAME ,, ^ ^ ^ ~ _ 
-ZJP_ 
Signature of Purchaser (New Owner) 
ADDRESS. 
crrY_ .ZIP-
UEN RELEASE 
Signature of Ueohoider Releasing Inters** 
bete" -iwsr 
Rt-ASSIGNY,cHT OF TfTlf EY i (ANSPEROR 
An Wance For ~ 
TrcJeHn Vehicle Ct>-
OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE. 
.For the Sales/Purchase price specified herein I (we) the undersigned owner(s) hereby transfer, 
convey and assign all rights title and interest to the vehicle described on tte face hereof to 
the New Owner named below and warrant the title to be free and clear of ail encumbrances, 
except a lien in favor of the person identified below as New Lien-Holder, if any 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW REQUIRE THAT THE OWNER STATE THE MILEAGE UPON TRANSFER"OPJDVVNERSHIP OF A ' \ L ~ 
FAILURE TO COMPLETE A STATEMENT, OR PROVIDING A FALSE STATEMENT, MAY RESULT IN FINES AJjp/QR IMPRISONMENT 
FHP 
- E S / P U R C H A £ E P GE 
$-
.J 
Transferor / Company Name (Name must be pnnted) 
whose current address is Street _ 
By Owner/Authorized Agent (Name must be panted) 
C i t y . 
«* "ODOMETER READINU 
_St„ 
. Z i p . mles (no tentrsy 
herety certify that on the date of this statement the odometer reads the mileage here recorded and tha£to the ocst o my ^ 
and belief this reflects the actual m teage for this vehicle unless one of the following is checked 
( »Reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the odometer mecbao»ca! limits 
f , Is NOT the actual mileage for this vehicie WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY 
* 19 
5«gnature of Transferor m ink (must be notarized) 
signature of Joint Transferor (must be notarized) 
Subscribed and sworn to this - day of _ 
NEW OWNER (Name must be printed) 
NAME 
ADDRESS-
CITY 
X., 
.ST_ 
19. Notary Seat 
Signature of Notary Public of M V Examiner """ 
NEW UEN-HOLDER (Name must beamed) 
NAME - — 
.Z1P_ 
Signature of Purchaser (New Owner) v 
ADDRESS-
CITY 
_$r~ .ZIFL 
UTAH CODE ANN § 4 1 - 1 - 6 2 REQUIRES THE OWNER TO REMOVE THE UCENSE PLATES UPON THE SALE^OR DISPOSAL OF A VEHICLE 
TRANS TECH, INC-
395 West 200 South 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
PH: (801) 875-6976 
-^ of 70 
December 21, 1993 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL -
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Wayne Sommers 
1788 East 5600 South 
Holiday, UT 84121 
Jack Sommers 
1861 Delann Lane 
Holiday, UT 84121 
Sommers Auto Wrecking 
647 West 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 
Enviro-West 
4747 South Cherry Street 
Midvale, UT 84121 
Re: Foreclosure of Lien Upon Truck 
(See enclosed copy of Utah Registration Certificate) 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed is a copy of a Service Order/Invoice which we sent 
to Wayne Sommers via Certified mail, return receipt requested, on 
November 8, 1993. He not only refused to claim this letter from 
the post office, but has refused to pay anything on that bill 
which became delinquent on November 1, 1993. Nor has any other 
person or entity paid anything. I also have enclosed a copy of a 
sheet which indicates the current balance due on this bill, after 
adding in appropriate interest and storage charges, which if paid 
in cash to Trans Tech within 7 days would be sufficient to redeem 
the truck. 
We have, of course, a lien under section 38-2-3, Utah 
Stats., on the truck described in the Service Order/Invoice for 
the full balance due on that bill for labor and services 
performed on the truck, as well as interest and storage charges 
which will be accruing on a daily basis hereafter, and our 
"costs" (e.g. attorney's fees) in foreclosing our lien. See e.g. 
Gunnison Valley Bk. v. Madsen, 685 P.2d 543 (Sup, Ct. Utah 1984) 
(implied contract); Howard v. J.P. Poulson Co., 41 Utah 490, 127 
Pac. 284 (1912); Westminister Inv. Co. v. McCurtain, 39 Utah 544, 
118 Pac. 564 (1911) (held as a matter of law lien existed as a 
result of implied contract). This lien is subject to enforcement 
under §38-2-4, Utah Stats., and the truck may be sold to satisfy 
the lien. 
Accordingly, please take notice that we will be (1) 
retaining possession of the truck at our premises unless and 
until the total balance due on the enclosed bill is fully paid 
and (2) foreclosing our lien and selling the truck on Saturday, 
February 19, 1994, at a public sale to be held at our premises 
commencing at 10:30 a.m. We will be selling the truck to the 
person or entity making the highest written offer therefor. The 
offers to be considered by us must, however, call for immediate 
payment via the offset of a valid lien (or liens) on the truck, 
cash, bank cashier's check and/or personal check certified by a 
bank. Trans Tech expects to make one or more offers. All such 
offers must be made in writing to Trans Tech and received by me 
at any time prior to 11:00 a.m. on February 19, 1994. Our 
decision as to the offer which has been accepted and the person 
or entity to whom Trans Tech will sell the truck, shall be made 
and announced publicly by me on our premises no later than 11:15 
a.m. on that day. 
If any of you claim that you have a valid lien on this 
truck, please so advise me in writing at your earliest 
convenience and also state whether or not you claim that the lien 
has priority over our lien. If you claim priority, please 
explain in detail in writing all reasons why you make this claim 
and also enclose fully legible copies of all documentation which 
you claim establishes the validity, amount and/or priority of the 
lien. Further please advise me in writing of (1) any persons or 
entities that you know of that claim any interest in and/or any 
lien on the truck and (2) any proposed additions, deletions 
and/or modifications of any of our present arrangements for the 
sale of the truck which you believe would be fairer, together 
with a detailed explanation of the reasons why you believe that 
they would fairer. 
Please take notice that according to the information we have 
been able to collect to date: 
1. The present registered owner of the truck is Jack W. 
Sommer, 1861 Delann Lane, Holiday UT 84121; 
2. Sommers Auto Wrecking, which sold the truck to Jack W, 
Sommer, claims a lien on the truck; 
Please also take notice that (1) under section 38:2:4, Utah 
Stats., subsection (b)(vii), "...the owner of the property 
[truck] has a right to recover possession of the property [truck] 
without instituting judicial proceedings by posting bond" and (2) 
50 
the mechanic is Dave Strebel whose business address and telephone 
number is the same as Trans Tech's. 
If any of you have any questions or desire to discuss 
anything, please contact me at your earliest convenience. 
Trans Tech, Inc. 
by: HjllLC 
Pennie Strebel 
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